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Abstract If ethics of care deals with the nature of relationships, attentiveness, and
understanding particular others, narrativity ought to play a central part. Sometimes,
caring simply amounts to working with narratives. In the article I claim that narr-
ativity can even be said to be native to an ethics of care. Through an example, I
demonstrate how a narrative ethics of care can discern and grasp some moral
problems better than the standard theoretical outlooks.
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There are many ways to reason about morality. In the past few decades the focus of
the academic literature has mainly been on the goodness and rightness of agency,
under the labels ‘consequentialism’ and ‘deontology’, respectively. In contrast,
existentialism, feminist reasoning and modern virtue ethics emphasise character,
identity, relations, and the context of agency. Ethics of care is a product of this
philosophical turn. Here, efforts are made to elaborate on the meaning and impact of
caring in various settings, from parental care to caring within professional life. The
focus is on how to care for the particular other or others, not on caring about things
or issues, even moral issues.
1 Is ethics of care just an addendum to traditional ethics,
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1 The caring for/caring about distinction is Joan Tronto’s [8]. Seyla Benhabib labels a similar distinction
‘Concrete Other’/‘Generalized Other’ [2].
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According to some commentators, proper caring is different, indeed ‘‘immune’’
from just following abstract principles (Tronto: 346). So what is caring? Does caring
describe substantially what one does to another, or does it describe—adverbially—
the manner in which things are done? Joan Tronto writes that ‘‘[c]aring implies
some kind of on-going responsibility and commitment’’, which makes us willing to,
among other things, ‘‘expend energy toward the object of care’’ (ibid, 347). As
caring involves a commitment, caring has an object, hence caring is relational, and
since the object in question is a human being, caring involves an understanding of
and a response to the other’s needs and expectations, strengths and inhibitions, as
well as the context of his or her particular situation. Understanding here means
forming a coherent opinion, an articulate belief about where this person is coming
from and where she would like to be going. Establishing the narrative of the other
requires conversation, listening, interpretation, what other commentators have
referred to as attentiveness to and knowledge of the other’s needs (ibid, p. 349).
Caring is not, however, simply catering to every whim and woe of the other, it may
also consist in mindful guidance of a patient, or in setting limits for a child, an
attempt at inﬂuencing the life-story of the other. There is also the question of what
one’s caring does to oneself, and to outsiders excluded from one’s caring. In what
sense should caring be altruistic? An ethics of care must deal with these difﬁcult
questions.
The aim here is not to address all these topics, but to argue that caring involves
working with narratives, and demonstrate how this can be done. A narrative
approach, I will claim, is native to an ethics of care. Furthermore, a narrative ethics
of care generates insights and an ability to discern phenomena that other forms of
ethics either lack, or would be hard pressed to incorporate. The vehicle I will use for
discussing these matters in this article is a dramatic case taken from a health care
setting.
A Painful Case: Jack & Jill
Jack (35), a college teacher and a father of two children aged 5 and 13 years, has
been a Jehovah’s Witness as long as he can remember. His wife died 3 years ago in
an accident. She was not a Jehovah’s Witness. His youngest child has accompanied
him to religious meetings, but the 13-year-old has never been a part of the Jehovah’s
Witness community. Jack is home from work today. He’s in pain. The family doctor
came to see him, and suspected that Jack suffered from appendicitis. He has referred
Jack to the nearby university clinic. Jack insisted on going there by taxi, not
ambulance.
In the pre-operation consultation with Jill, an experienced surgeon, Jack appears
anxious. He has never been admitted to a hospital ward before. At the end of the
consultation he mentions that he is a Jehovah’s Witness. Surgeon Jill assures Jack
that the procedure is low-risk, that she has never even considered blood transfusion
during appendectomy. Jack appears to calm down. He adds that he has a standard
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forgot to bring it, though—‘‘I guess what will be, will be’’, he says with a faint
smile. Jill says it makes no difference: ‘‘I would only be interested in your signature
anyway. So it is not really required. We’ll respect your point of view. Anyway, soon
you’ll be on the mend…’’ She goes on to explain what will happen to him. ‘‘I guess
what will be, will be’’, he repeats. They part cordially, and soon Jack is prepared for
the operation.
During the procedure Jill punctures an artery by accident. Jack loses blood at an
alarming rate. Jill hesitates and her team soon questions her indecisiveness. Jill
informs them that the patient is a Jehovah’s Witness. Startled looks are exchanged,
instruments are monitored. ‘‘It’s my call,’’ Jill says, ‘‘We’re losing the patient.’’
They start with blood transfusion. Despite this and other life-saving measures, Jack
dies on the operating table.
Surgeon Jill is upset and even considers omitting from the journal that Jack
received blood. She is not quite sure that her hesitation was decisive for the fatal
outcome. But it certainly didn’t help. Am I in denial? She curses the Jehovah’s
Witness policy for a minute, pities Jack’s children, blames herself. But such things
do happen! Not misconduct, just…plain bad luck. She always knew things like this
could happen. Medical errors are commonplace, but fatal errors… If she had only
asked him properly in advance… The two kids—where are they now? Why on earth
do they refuse transfusion? Why did I even bother?
The Narrative Approach
Is the surgeon to blame in this case, or was she simply unlucky? Did she care
properly for Jack, or is proper caring impossible given the Jehovah’s Witness
standpoint? How does one retrieve an informed consent—or at least some kind of
understanding—under such circumstances? Obviously, Jill cared for Jack’s well-
being. She discussed the matter with him, she understood where he was coming
from, and she respected his view. She made it easy for him to stand his ground. Not
that she for her life would really understand it. But right before an operation is not
the time to challenge religious beliefs. The best way of caring for Jack was simply to
make him feel at ease. If the operation had gone as planned, her conduct would
never have been questioned. On the contrary, Jack would shortly have been out of
the hospital, grateful to the surgeon who removed his pain and respected his
standpoint to boot. The ﬁrst impression is therefore that Jill’s conduct was
impeccable, but ethics is about thinking at least twice.
A narrative ethicist works with stories rather than facts, rules and principles.
Here I will follow Abbott’s approach loosely [1]. We will therefore ﬁrst identify
and discuss the relevant background stories, or ‘‘master narratives’’, in order to
provide context for the situation at hand. Next, we will evaluate the core narrative
(i.e. the Jack & Jill case) from two perspectives, so as to broaden our
understanding of what happens. Finally, we will focus on closure, that is, discuss
different courses of action and the endings they entail, and which will have the
greatest acceptability.
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‘Blood’ is a rich notion, signalling kinship and conﬂict, holiness and impurity;
sometimes life itself. It holds the power to turn faces pale, or to arouse people.
Blood stains stories of crime and stories of love. Massive loss of blood follows in
the wake of violence, sickness and suffering, and ultimately leads to loss of life. But
the story of how doctors have compensated for blood loss is long and interesting,
too. Not only because it adds to the drama already present, but because it introduces
a novel set of problems. As Jack and Jill seem to hold different views on blood
transfusion, we need to study the master narratives that allow for this difference of
opinion.
2 Without knowing their opinions, it is difﬁcult to know what is at stake. Let
us have a look at the mainstream view ﬁrst.
After William Harvey successfully demonstrated heart-driven blood circulation
in 1648, scientiﬁc attempts to transfer blood between animals or humans were soon
made. Although some degree of success is recorded, the characteristics of blood
were not well understood. Only after Karl Landsteiner’s description of different
blood groups began receiving attention in 1909, did direct blood transfusion become
a standard therapeutic means. During WW1, techniques for storing and transfusing
blood were developed and reﬁned. With anticoagulants and refrigeration, blood
could now be stored for days, and blood banks became a possibility. Hospitals could
access blood given by anonymous donors. Needless to say, blood banks
revolutionised medical practice. Today, components of blood are stored, and much
research is put into creating artiﬁcial blood products. Blood transfusion is
considered as a safe and efﬁcient way of increasing blood volume or the oxygen-
carrying capacity of blood during or after surgery. Transfusion saves patients every
day. Therefore, surgeon Jill always keeps a unit or two of blood handy when
operating. Not that she always needs it. Sometimes it is just a precaution; to
counteract the unforeseen. And quite often, Jill gives the patient a unit for boosting
the number of red blood cells after an intervention. She believes this to be beneﬁcial
for patient recovery. This is what cheating athletes do to increase their performance.
Jill does the same in the name of the good.
However, there is a ﬂop side to the coin. The quality control, here as elsewhere, is
not perfect. Blood transfusion introduces the risk of side-effects. Most of the time as
mild allergic reactions, but sometimes side-effects can be lethal. The chance,
however, of contracting hepatitis or HIV infection through blood transfusion is one
in two million units. So most people think the beneﬁts outweigh the costs by many
orders of magnitude. However, that is not to deny that sometimes the patient would
be better off by not being given blood. Maybe better techniques or advance planning
would lessen the need for blood transfusion, thus minimising the risk of side-effects
and shortage of blood. That blood transfusion is an asset is indisputable, but whether
today’s practice is optimal remains a question.
2 Several master narratives are relevant to this case—the role of the clinic, paternalism and autonomy,
law and medicine, to mention a few. The most important stories in our connection deal with blood
transfusion. This is where Jack and Jill’s opinions diverge. What the one considers to be the master
narrative, the other may consider as a deviant narrative.
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ought to be saved in this manner. Blood is a sacred substance and not some
commodity. In the Scripture the Lord bans ‘‘eating blood’’, a statement that the
Watchtower Society—the authority for Jehovah’s Witnesses—interprets as includ-
ing the practice of blood transfusion. The ban on eating blood is stated several times
in the Old Testament. For instance, in Leviticus 7:26 it is written that ‘‘You are not
to eat any blood, either of bird or animal, in any of your dwellings.’’ And later, in
Leviticus 17:10, the vengeful Lord claims that ‘‘And any man from the house of
Israel, or from the aliens who sojourn among them, who eats any blood, I will set
My face against that person who eats blood and will cut him off from among his
people.’’ Similar passages are found in Acts (15:19–20) and in Deuteronomy
(12:23–25), where the Lord identiﬁes blood with life: ‘‘Only be sure not to eat the
blood, for the blood is the life, and you shall not eat the life with the ﬂesh.’’
Few non-Witnesses would drink the blood of another human being. Analogously,
Witnesses claim that blood transfusion is out of the question. However, some have
pointed out that the Old Testament hardly addresses modern blood transfusion. You
do not really eat through the cardiovascular system.
3 Consequently the ban on blood
transfusion rests on a misunderstanding. But if ‘eating’ is interpreted broadly, for
instance as ‘assimilating a substance’, the Watchtower society’s standpoint still
makes sense. And face it, if you should not eat blood, then you are certainly not to
take it intravenously! Blood is life itself and should not be transferred from one
person to another—like some commodity. It is the secret of life. Therefore,
Jehovah’s Witnesses deny themselves some life-saving interventions. This is
sometimes hard to accept for health care workers, for surgeons that have to let
perfectly saveable patients die. It is no doubt hard for the patients themselves. But
some things are more important than living—to deny blood transfusions seems to be
the ultimate test of faith. This is where the true believers can be separated from
those who put themselves ﬁrst.
4
The ban on blood transfusion seems to be written in stone, but as with the
mainstream story, exceptions and reservations can be found. This is not surprising
as the stakes are high, and the risks and beneﬁts are matters of faith, although the
Watchtower seems to emphasise the medical beneﬁts of not receiving blood on their
homepage. Jehovah’s Witnesses want modern health services. Therefore, they
‘‘accept—and vigorously pursue—medical alternatives to blood’’. ‘‘Jehovah’s
Witnesses actively seek the best in medical treatment,’’ said Dr. Richard K.
Spence, when director of surgery at a New York hospital. ‘‘As a group, they are the
best educated consumers the surgeon will ever encounter’’ [6]. The Watchtower
society’s position may thus help in developing health services. However, advanced
techniques and methods seldom apply to emergency situations involving massive
loss of blood.
3 See for instance, Geisler and Howe [4], p. 434].
4 In most countries, this sacriﬁce can only be made by adults, but from a point of view of the Watchtower
society the ban is valid for minors as well. Glaringly, this was the message of the magazine Awake! when
it pictured ‘‘Youths Who Put God First’’ on the cover of the May 22, 1994 edition. The cover pictured
youths who had followed the Watchtower’s interpretation, and died after denying blood transfusion.
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the grounds that he or she received blood as a last measure. Being too hard on the
‘sinner’ would certainly contradict other teachings of the Bible. Today, those who
receive blood are not disfellowshipped if the Witness claims weakness of will after
the fact. In light of less absolutist view on blood products, this seems reasonable. In
the new millennium, the Watchtower society accepts the use of blood products like
albumin, EPO, haemoglobin and blood serums to some degree, and makes this a
matter of conscience for each Witness: ‘‘[w]hen it comes to fractions of any of the
primary components, each Christian, after careful and prayerful meditation, must
conscientiously decide for himself’’ [7, pp. 29–31]. With the latest inclusions to the
list, the society accepts every component of blood, but not whole blood. Given the
consequences this policy has had, it is perhaps no surprise that the end point of this
slippery-slope is hard for many Witnesses to accept. In the past the Watchtower has
taken a similar stand on other medical practices, only to abandon its position later.
This was the case with vaccines, which were held to be ‘‘a direct violation of the
everlasting covenant that God made with Noah after the ﬂood’’ [5, p. 293].
The Jehovah’s Witness story is, in other words, not as absolutist as it may seem at
the ﬁrst glance. But the views of the authorities and actual practices may differ. The
central authority is weaker than local social control. Jack may be a fundamentalist
on this issue, it may even be his chance to prove himself to himself and to his
community—even to his children. Doubts and discussions about blood transfusion
exist among Jehovah’s Witnesses, but overemphasising the ambiguities may lead us
to ‘overread’ the Jehovah’s Witness master narrative. Similarly, disregarding the
differing opinions within the milieu would represent a form of ‘underreading’.
5
These are the two most important pitfalls in explaining the context of the case.
This example shows that master narratives are not stereotypes, but complex and
sometimes amorphous. Knowledge of these complexities provides us with a
repertoire of possibilities and angles for discussing relevant matters.
Readings of the Core Case
The core case about Jack and Jill is easier to handle because it involves few people.
But it is also more difﬁcult because Jack is dead and we cannot know what he his
motives and thoughts—or even if he had a stable opinion at all. We can investigate
Jill’s, but her memory may be coloured by the tragic outcome. We will never know
the whole truth. What we can do as ethicists is indicate what could have been
different. We will consider this by taking the core case as reconstructed above. In
order to gain understanding we have to consider the story from three points of view:
an intentional (stated overtly), symptomatic (e.g. what is not said), and adaptive
(e.g. imagining other possible trajectories).
An intentional reading addresses what is openly stated, and from this perspective
the story seems straightforward. Surgeon Jill’s intention is to cure patient Jack. She
also intends to respect her patient’s wishes and make the experience as painless as
possible. Therefore, she soothes anxious patient Jack in the pre-operative
5 ‘Underreading’ and ‘overreading’ are Frank Kermode’s terms. See [1].
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is comfortable that this is a correct interpretation, because the only reason Jack
would bring up his religious afﬁliation would be in connection with a possible blood
transfusion. Jack’s primary intention is getting well. That is why he is seeking
medical treatment. He wants the surgeon to know that he is a Jehovah’s Witness,
and that he possesses an advance will declaring that he does not want blood
transfusion. The accident, of course, was not intended by either of the parties. Jack
was anaesthetized, Jill was not reckless—she cannot quite explain why it happened.
When it did, the intention to save his life proved stronger than the intention to cater
to his wishes. The intentional reading renders Jill a caring physician who got
unlucky.
A symptomatic reading emphasises what is not overtly expressed in the narrative.
It aims at pointing out what is communicated indirectly, what the interlocutors will
not or cannot tell. Special wordings or omissions are common markers of such
suppressed information. Admittedly, this involves some degree of guesswork, and
the danger of overreading is always present. We therefore need to argue our case
perhaps more carefully than was the case in our intentional reading. In the
conversation between Jack and Jill there are some issues that can be seen to be
hinted at, understated, or implicitly understood. For instance, why did Jack forget his
declaration? Why didn’t Jack say explicitly that he didn’t want a blood transfusion
under any circumstances? What did his repeated statement ‘‘What will be will be’’
mean? And why didn’t Jill raise the question of what to do in emergencies?
To address the latter question ﬁrst: Would she have talked about the what-ifs to a
non-Witness patient? She was completely conﬁdent that Jack would not need it, so
we have no reason to believe that she would have raised the issue. But as a surgeon
she knows that complications may occur. Good patient care implies a dose of
relevant ifs and buts, without scaring the patient unnecessarily. If Jack (or any other
patient) had asked her directly about the risks, we have no reason to believe that she
would not have volunteered any information. The case does not really reveal
whether Jack is following the traditional Jehovah’s Witness line. He has signed a
hypothetical contract, but he did not bring it. Maybe this simple fact should have
made Jill venture into an exchange of opinion? Does he usually carry it?
Admittedly, discussing the declaration could have upset Jack. Maybe Jill,
subconsciously, likes to keep her options open? If we have not discussed it, then
I make the decisions. Or, maybe she considers even hinting at religious views as too
paternalist? Is that why she acts so conﬁdently? She avoids a difﬁcult discussion,
while Jack’s anxiety is lessened. A win–win situation. But Jack’s anxiety may stem
from the unfamiliarity of the hospital situation, or from being anesthetised and
brought under the knife for the ﬁrst time. Introducing the Jehovah’s Witness aspect
might overshadow such issues, and he regrets it. Maybe he feels that there are so
much at stake that he is about to reconsider his stand on blood transfusion. After all,
he is a single parent. Although this is not the time to abandon his beliefs, maybe he
wanted to discuss it with an outsider. Jill had been aware that some Witnesses
accept a wide range of blood products, she might have felt that this was a topic that
ought to be discussed with Jack. Maybe if she had known that quite a few patients
even accept whole blood, without wanting any fuss made about it, well, maybe she
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perhaps have been a near-impossible discussion to initiate, given Jack’s pain.
Nevertheless…
Is this a gross overreading, or do we have any evidence to say that Jack has
ambiguous thoughts on the issue? At ﬁrst glace, he simply states that he is a
Jehovah’s Witness, and that he has a valid declaration. It is understandable that he
has left it at home. He was in a hurry, he was anxious, he was in pain. However,
saying that he left his declaration/statement ‘‘at home’’ may indicate that he did not
forget it, but more or less deliberately left it. ‘‘The statement is there, I am here.’’ He
didn’t say he was sorry that he forgot this piece of paper, or that he could produce it
somehow, or that the hospital could call. He just mentioned it, and then Jill hurriedly
assured him that ‘‘the procedure is low-risk’’, and that she has ‘‘never even
considered blood transfusion during appendectomy’’. Maybe Jack feels that he
cannot go further without coming close to denouncing his stand actively. If it is low-
risk, it may not be worth problematising his religious policy. ‘‘What will be will
be.’’ Seeing him calm down, Jill ends the conversation, thereby cementing her view
of him as a stereotypic Jehovah’s Witness. If Jack wants to express doubts, he must
explain that not all Jehovah’s Witnesses are absolutist in this regard and that he,
even if he has co-signed the declaration, considers survival to be more important, at
least as long as he has small children… But since the surgeon has ended the
conversation, this would be difﬁcult. So understanding that the timing is all wrong,
he puts his life in the hands of fate. ‘‘What will be, will be.’’ This utterance can be
seen as a giving up—I cannot speak my mind. There are at least two symptoms in
the text, indicating that Jack wants to discuss ‘‘outside of the box’’. Is this an
overreading of the original narrative? Before we discuss this topic further, let us
have a closer look at the third way of reading.
In an adaptative reading, we alter conditions and utterances and study what
difference such changes make: ‘‘What if Jill had asked…’’, ‘‘If Jack instead of X
had said Y…’’, ‘‘What if this was a pre-planned procedure?’’ and so forth. This
resembles standard scientiﬁc experimentation and enhances our understanding of
the case, and why we think things matter. But it also has a normative function. We
may come to agree that some type of action is right or wrong, good or bad, better or
worse. In the present case we may even conclude that even with the sparse
information Jill had, she should have acted differently in order to secure relevant
information. Retrospective wisdom, perhaps, but the point is to learn from the
experience, not to judge Jill.
Let us assume that this is a crisis for Jack, a last opportunity to revise or suspend
his standpoints—he might not be fully aware that this is the case. He is only half-
way to realising that he is changing. He feels that this is the time, but maybe he
cannot voice this opinion all by himself, he can only manage to send some subtle
signals. No freely stated informed consent at the time. No straightforward talk. He
needs help. How could Jill assist him? Is it Jill’s task to do so? Would it be proper
care or unacceptable intrusion to even try? Is Jill justiﬁed in just repeating that Jack
is a Jehovah’s Witness and assuming that he is in line with the traditional view—a
stereotype? Is she justiﬁed in trying to make Jack act out of character, in challenging
his religious beliefs, in the name of what is most convenient for herself and her
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parent? All these lines seem dissatisfactory. How can she make sure that Jack’s own
voice is heard? How should she introduce the topic and when should she stop? Let
us recapitulate the ﬁrst part of the conversation between Jack and Jill:
First part (0)
Jack: I have never really been to a hospital before… I’ve been here before, but
never as a patient…
Jill: I know what you mean, Jack. You go about your everyday life, and suddenly
you are a patient… The good news is that we won’t keep you long. We do this
operation all the time. You’ll be back teaching in no time. We’ve already given you
some intravenous antibiotics to avoid further complications. We will soon introduce
general anaesthesia so that you won’t notice a thing. I will then ﬁnd your appendix
and make sure it won’t bother you again. Then I’ll stitch you up. Then we’ll talk
some more. It has been a pretty painful day, I guess?
Jack: Yes, of that I can assure you. I would do almost anything to make this pain
go away. I’m glad that you, you seem to know your business… You, you know that
I am a Jehovah’s Witness?
Second part (0):
Jill: As I said, this procedure is routine… low-risk. I have never even considered
blood transfusion during appendectomy, so you should be alright.
Jack: Right. Uh, I have a declaration signed by two of the elders. But, uh, I forgot
to bring it… What will be, will be…
Jill: Don’t let that bother you, Jack. I would only be interested in your signature
anyway. So it is not really required. We’ll respect your point of view. Anyway, soon
you’ll be on the mend…
Jack: Yes, I guess what will be, will be (he smiles faintly).
(They exchange smiles and Jill leaves the room)
Let us consider some other paths the story could have taken:
Second part (1): Jill thinks Jack’s forgetfulness is a sign that he accepts blood
transfusions:
Jill: Since you brought it up like that, does that mean that you are ﬂexible with
regard to religion on this point… Or more precisely, blood transfusion…
Jack: No, no, I’ve been a Jehovah’s Witness all my life, I’m not copping out now.
Jill: And no exceptions are allowed, right?
Jack: Right.
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The accident happens, but Jill never considers blood transfusion. She is not
comfortable with the situation, but she feels that it was Jack’s conviction that killed
him.
Second part (2): Jill is familiar with Jack’s master narrative and tries to make
him reconsider:
Jill: Keeping some blood units handy makes it easier for us—and it’s safer for
you. It’s how I prefer to work. It’s prudent, I think. I know this is difﬁcult for you,
but I also know that the WTS is changing its attitude. In some years I guess we
would not be having this discussion. After all, vaccines pose no problem anymore. I
know that you’ve got a lot to live for—and I understand it perfectly if you don’t
want to take any unnecessary risks… Ok… It’s your call of course. I’ll follow your
guidelines.
Jack: I don’t know what to do… It’ll be okay…
Jill: Ok. I will use my best judgement. Don’t worry, Jack. You’ll be out in no
time!
The accident happens, but Jack lives. He ﬁles a complaint afterwards. He says
that Jill forced her values upon him at a difﬁcult moment, and that his life is ruined.
Second part (3): Jill scouts the territory, pressuring Jack mildly:
Jill: Jack, although appendectomy is a straight-forward intervention, you know
that there is, as always, a slight risk that something unforeseen can happen… Given
the circumstances, I know I have to bring this up with you…
Jack: [nods]
Jill: (she leaves ample time for Jack to speak) I know, or at least I think I know
where you’re coming from, and I fully respect it. In some regards your stand makes
us improve our medical services. That is a good thing. However, in case something
unforeseen happens during the operation, I will use my best judgment. Is that ok
with you?
Jack: [Nods again, almost imperceptibly]
Jill: I’m sorry I needed to raise the issue. As I said, this is a routine operation.
You’ll be just ﬁne, Jack…
The accident happens, but Jill is better prepared. Maybe there is no happy ending
to be had, but in all these alternative endings some nagging doubts are at least
eliminated. Therefore, they probably represent better courses of action than the
original one, which left Jill uncertain of how to act in an emergency. Are these
narratives also examples of better caring than the original case? I would venture to
say yes, with the possible exception of (1). The way she asks him seems too direct,
even provocative, unless strong non-verbal signs indicated that this approach was
acceptable. The answer she gets is equally direct. Then she secures the information
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us to attempt to participate in the other’s story, closure comes too soon here. One or
two open questions would have mapped his opinions better. She is certainly not
forming a better relationship with Jack by proceeding in this manner. Good caring
requires forming a (here: professional) relationship. This is not the same as just
making things easier for the other. His truthful answer is of great consequence.
In the second example Jill puts pressure on Jack through her interpretation of the
validity of his master narrative. After doing so, she says that she will try not to
inﬂuencehischoiceatall.Onemaywellarguethatthisisexactlywhatshetriestodoin
the ﬁrst place. She saves his life, so from the perspective of medical care (and her
Hippocratic Oath) she does the prudent thing. Given the circumstances, Jack will
probablynotbeexpelledfromhisreligiouscommunity,andJillmustprobablyassume
blame for what happened. She will probably not receive anything but a mild warning
from her superiors. Rigging the scene so that she will be the one to blame may not be
the worst kind of caring, at least not if Jack learns to live with the wrong done to him.
Moreover, the seriousness of the situation may justify a no-nonsense approach.
The third scenario differs from the last one in that issues are merely hinted at.
Does Jill go too far in leading Jack here? The ‘consent’ she obtained is hardly
optimal. Is it fair to press for an opinion in this manner? Is she justiﬁed in acting
upon a weak nod when Jack was able to speak? If Jack died, how would she answer
if his next of kin inquired ‘‘We hope no blood transfusion took place?’’ Could she
justify saying ‘‘yes’’ but that ‘‘it was Jack’s own wish’’? Her caring for him is based
on his silence and his nods. As was the case in (2), she should be ready to assume
the blame if necessary, but there is nothing that indicates that she does not take care
of his interests. After all, Jack has no death wish—he calls for the doctor and
accepts surgery. Of course, Jill also takes care of her own interests—she is there to
save lives. That is why she chose to become a physician, and it is what she has
sworn to do. It is against her reﬂexes and professional pride not to do everything she
can to save lives. In addition, she feels safer—a better surgeon—if there are no
constraints present. She knows that Jack is against blood transfusion, but not how
strongly. She also knows that what is a question of either-or on paper, may be
negotiable in practice. She knows that people change when they are experiencing
crises. As Rita Charon writes:
Old family secrets, long-time troubling issues, deeply felt but unexpressed
emotions – all muted or somehow removed from the surface of daily lives over the
years – often become visible and expressed in ways that they are at no other time
during our lives. Serious illness can be, and often is, a time of profound change in
the lives of patients and those closest to them [3, p. x].
It is part of being a carer for a human being in crisis to inquire into such matters,
but how? Maybe she is too blunt in (2), too cautious in (3).
A Narrative Ethics of Care
As mentioned in the introduction, there is an ongoing discussion about whether
ethics of care is an ethical theory in its own right or simply an addendum to
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important. If some line of ethical reasoning works, i.e. produces useful insights and
perspectives, we ought to develop it further. No ethical theory can claim to excel in
every aspect of morality. Ethics of care is a relatively new branch of ethics and all
its features have not been ﬁrmly established and developed. Here, I claim a narrative
aspect is one such central feature. It may even be seen as a deﬁning feature. But
such a claim hinges on the idea that narrative reasoning is somehow intrinsic to
ethics of care, and not simply a tool that can be used for any old theory.
If consequentialism or deontology had been our point of departure we would
most likely have overlooked the issues troubling surgeon Jill. Performing
Benthamite feliciﬁc calculus [9,p .1 9 ff] or asking Jack to rank his preferences
would simply not have been very helpful. We would, somehow, have had to ask
Jack to estimate the weight of his religious and parental obligations, in addition to
those he holds towards himself. This might well not be a question without a deﬁnite
answer. The manner in which such questions are posed has an effect on the answer.
Going for a signed testimony under the circumstances fares little better than Jill’s
assumption that Jack is completely in line with Jehovah’s Witness policy on this
issue, because he considers himself a Jehovah’s Witness.
A similar critique can be raised with regard to deontology. Checking out the
universalisability of the maxims of Jill’s actions would have fared little better than
the Benthamite attempt. Jill is doing her duty. Patient autonomy is well taken care
of, right up to the point where she has to make decisions on a shaky foundation.
Potentially, both consequentialism and deontology may justify Jill’s actions. These
theories would be perfect if Jack’s views and opinions were written in stone—
coherent, consistent, stable. My claim is that we would do even better if we could
allow for greater complexity. The problem is that in order to become privy to Jack’s
complex attitudes and sensitive information—knowing when to withdraw and when
to proceed—Jill must form a professional, trusting relationship with Jack. If not, she
will not be granted access to his ‘‘sensitive’’ information. Jack must trust that Jill
will act in his best interests and must entrust her with the necessary information. In
the original narrative, the conversation stopped short of real understanding. Jill
might have been right, but she can never know for sure. Caring as mere stereotypical
assumption is not good enough. In alternatives (2) and (3), Jill at least came closer.
Proper caring requires communicative skills, the ability to scrutinise and contex-
tualise the narratives of the other (e.g. the patient), to catch the drift of the other’s
life story. This may amount to ‘‘merely’’ being able to apply some conversational
techniques, but in practice it requires the (ethical) skill of putting oneself in the
place of the other, of ﬁlling in the blanks where the other cannot or will not speak,
and of securing this information, somehow. To be able to imagine acceptable
trajectories. It also requires a keen sense of one’s own motives and interests.
An additional feature ties the narrative approach to caring, and thus also to an
ethics of care. Narratives are not only therapeutic means, they are often therapy
itself. Listening to the other, and demonstrating the willingness and ability to
facilitate, mirror, interpret and understand the words and narratives of the other, are
often in themselves therapeutic activities and a direct expressions of caring. It is
simply difﬁcult to imagine caring without the carer understanding the spoken or
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from caring, an ethics of care must have the resources to receive, evaluate—even
create—narrative elements. Through tracing the relevant ‘‘master narratives’’,
reading the intentions, the symptoms, and evaluating alternative (adaptive) endings
of the Jack and Jill story, we have seen one way of doing ethics of care narratively.
A narrative approach is, of course, helpful to other methods of ethics, too, but it is a
intrinsic part of an ethics of care. Or so I claim.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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